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Metropolitan Problems and Local Govern-
ment Structure: An Examination of Old
And New Issues
Daniel R. Grant*
At a time when our leading popular magazines are featuring
cover headlines on "The Sick, Sick Cities," and articles on their
"Battle for Survival" 1 it seems appropriate to examine some old and
new issues concerning the relationship of metropolitan problems to
local government structure. The journalists who write such articles
probably hear a great deal about the frustrating legal and political
obstacles to achieving more rational forms of government for our
exploding, strife-torn metropolitan areas. They probably do not hear,
however, that political scientists are divided on such questions as the
reality of "metropolitan-type" problems and the feasibility of area-
wide metropolitan government. It is the purpose of this article to take
an analytical and somewhat reflective view of these older problems
and arguments in the light of recent developments.
I. How REAL ARE "METROPOLITAN-TYPE" PROBLEMS?
In considering the question of exactly how real metropolitan
problems are, it is appropriate to summarize the five or six problems
traditionally said to grow out of the fragmented structure of our 233
metropolitan areas and their more than 20,000 units of local
government.2 Not every area is as badly fragmented as are the top ten
in the United States, which average close to 500 separate governments
for each. But no metropolitan area has only a single government, and
the average for all metropolitan areas is close to 90 separate units of
government.
Several years ago, 112 metropolitan surveys that had been
conducted during a 30 year period were analyzed. Varying widely in
sponsorship, purpose, methodology, and final recommendations, the
surveys described, with unusual agreement, a common set of
* Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Urban and Regional Development Cen-
ter, Vanderbilt University.
I. NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1969, at 40.
2. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Standard Metropolitan StatisticalAreas 4-23, 26-43 (1967).
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problems which they attributed to the governmental patchwork quilt
in the metropolis These were not just urban problems, such as traffic
congestion, crime, or slums; they were uniquely metropolitan problems
said to be related to governmental fragmentation in the metropolitan
area. This common set of problems includes: (1) the unequal
distribution of financial resources and financial burdens between core
city and suburbs, and between wealthier suburbs and poorer suburbs;
(2) unequal service levels in different parts of the metropolitan area;
(3) the absence of area-wide authority to cope with essentially area-
wide problems; (4) wasteful duplication and inefficiency through the
overlap and fractionalization of units of government within a single
area; (5) the inability of citizens to fix responsibility and hold officials
accountable for local government action or inaction; and (6) the
political segregation of able suburban leaders from involvement in the
most serious core city problems. Although this latter problem did not
show up in bold type in most of the 112 metropolitan surveys studied,
it should be included as an emerging problem dramatized by both the
accelerated war on poverty and the intensified racial tensions of recent
years.
Because political scientists conducted most of the surveys from
which this summary of metropolitan problems was taken, it is
sometimes assumed that this appraisal of metropolitan fragmentation
constitutes a kind of "party line" of political scientists. Even if this
assumption were once true, it certainly has run into strong
countervailing winds in recent years. Vincent Ostrom and others
accuse the metropolitan surveyors of arbitrarily jumping to the
conclusion that many units of government are automatically bad and
that a neat and clean organization chart is automatically good. These
writers question the assumption "that the multiplicity of political
units in a metropolitan area is essentially a pathological
phenomenon. ' 4 Charles Adrian mounts a strong attack on the
assumptions of metropolitan reform advocates, primarily on grounds
that such complaints as lack of efficiency and economy are serious
problems only in the minds of the reformers and are of relatively little
concern to the average voter. Adrian accuses metropolitan reformers
of "almost total lack of concern with the political process and the
probable ignorance . . . of the fact that a democratic public is a
3. See Grant, General Metropolitan Surveys: A Summary, in METROPOLITAN SURVEYS: A
DIGEST 3 (1958).
4. Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 831 (1961).
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'satisficing' public and not one concerned with optimum economy."
He also attacks such assumptions as "the core city of a metropolitan
area must 'expand or die' " and "a metropolitan area is a monolithic
interest-a single community." '5 Martin Meyerson and Edward C.
Banfield express sharp disagreement with what they call the "crisis
view" of the American metropolis. They deny any impending
catastrophe for the metropolis and contend that the crisis view leads
to "foolish and futile policy prescriptions." 6 James M. Banovetz
dissents from the common charge that the core city subsidizes the
suburbs because of fragmentation, and even doubts that serious
problems of subsidies exist.
7
This kind of skepticism of the reality of metropolitan problems
stands in sharp contrast to the growing stream of literature on such
subjects as air pollution, water shortage, stream pollution, traffic and
parking congestion, mass transit dilemmas and the growing intensity
of problems related to racial and economic ghettos. History has not
been kind to Meyerson and Banfield, whose book denouncing the
"crisis view" of the American metropolis was published shortly
before the urban riots in Watts, Detroit, Newark, Washington, and
elsewhere. Certainly one kind of metropolitan crisis was, and is, upon
us. Furthermore, one can hardly read the six or eight most recent
major books and reports on urban transportation without concluding
that this particular problem is very "real" and is closely related to
governmental fragmentation in the metropolis.8
The effects of governmental fragmentation upon urban renewal
have been described very well' by Scott Greer and David W. Minar:
Urban renewal is limited by the dichotomy of public and private control, tension
between federal and municipal agencies, division of power between different
federal agencies, and fragmentation of power at the local community level ....
At the metropolitan level, the multitude of jurisdictions-cities, towns, suburbs,
special districts, counties, and even states-makes any over-all planning of the
city a farce . . . . The central city-suburb schisms turn urban renewal into a
holy war to recapture the suburban, white, middle class-a war the central city is
5. Adrian, Metropology: Folklore and Fieia Research. 21 PUB. A.. REV. 148-49, 152 (1961).
6. M. MEYERSON & E. BANFIELD, BOSTON: THE JOB AHEAD 3 (1966).
7. Banovetz, Metropolitan Subsidies-an Appraisal 25 PUB. AD. REV. 297 (1965).
8. See, e.g., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION POLICIES: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL LEADERSHIP (1965); M. DANIELSON, FEDERAL-
METROPOLITAN POLITICS AND THE COMMUTER CRISIS (1965); J. MEYER, J. KAIN, & M. WOHL, THE
URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM (1965); W. OWEN, THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
PROBLEM (Rev. ed. 1966); UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, 89th CONG., 2D SESS., METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE To FEDERALISM (1966).
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doomed to lose-and distract attention from the major clientele of the central
city: the working class, the ethnics, the disprivileged.
What can be more real than the role of governmental
fragmentation in creating artificial political walls between "black
power" core city governments and "white power" suburban city
governments at a time when ghetto problems cry out for joint effort
toward joint solutions? In a 1967 study of the fiscal aspects of
metropolitanism, Alan Campbell and Seymour Sacks contend that
metropolitan fragmentation has serious consequences for the core
city's education problem. They conclude:
The need is for the concentration of educational resources in the central cities. It
is in these cities that the educational function is most difficult to perform
adequately. Yet the present system distributes resources in exactly the opposite
direction, less where the problems are most severe and more where the problems
are relatively easy to cope with."'
In direct response to the original question, it seems clear to this
writer that "metropolitan-type" problems are painfully real, perhaps
more so now than ever before. The persistent distress signals from the
cities are related too consistently to the fragmented condition of local
government to dismiss fragmentation as an imaginary problem in the
minds of "purist" academicians. This conclusion was thrust home by
the almost pathetic testimony of Mayor Yorty of Los Angeles before a
United States Senate subcommittee which was inquiring into the level
of services provided in the Watts area. He responded that many, and
perhaps most, of the functions and services with which the Senators
were concerned were not the legal responsibility of the City of Los
Angeles, but were split up between Los Angeles County, various school
districts, special districts and authorities, and the State of California."1
To the average television viewer, the mayor seemed to have been
evading the Senators' questions; indeed, one senator remarked that
the City of Los Angeles "doesn't stand for a damn thing." In fact,
however, the offspring of metropolitan fragmentation had come home
to roost, .and the mayor's television performance merely dramatized
the results.
II. WHAT IS MEANT BY "METROPOLITAN COORDINATION?"
One possible explanation for the widespread skepticism
concerning the reality of "metropolitan-type problems" is that public
9. Greer & Minar, The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment, 352
ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. AND Soc. SCIENCE, 62, 67 (1964).
10. A. CAMPBELL & S. SACKS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: FISCAL PATTERNS AND
GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS 181 (1967).
11. Id. at 180.
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administration consultants and reformers have relied too heavily on
abstract textbook terms in describing the needs of metropolitan areas.
To the political scientist, the term "coordination" is said to mean
"the adjustment of the working parts of the whole in the achievement
of common goals." The use of this academic jargon, however, makes
it exceedingly difficult to communicate the urgency of the problem to
the man on the street. The fact remains, however, that the future of
the metropolis probably depends upon whether sufficient coordination,
in its precise sense, can be achieved.
There are four types of coordination in metropolitan government:
geographic, functional, financial, and human. Some of these
"working parts of the whole" are recognized and understood more
widely than others. For example, it is possible for the many separate
cities in a metropolitan area to have worked out reasonable solutions
to the problems of geographic or financial coordination only to have
a paralyzing crisis in the coordination of human resources. Similarly,
it is possible to achieve a high degree of functional coordination
among health, educational, welfare, or other programs in one city, but
to have these programs working at cross purposes to projects in
several other cities within the same metropolitan area. Thus it
becomes important to consider the nature of each aspect of the
metropolitan coordination problem.
A. Geographic Coordination
The lack of geographic coordination in metropolitan areas-the
"bad neighbor problem"--is perhaps the most visible and most often
cited problem. Failure to coordinate the governmental effort of the
several geographic parts of a metropolitan area may result in
dumping of sewage by one government in ways that conflict with the
efforts of another government to provide its residents with water
supply or recreation facilities. Failure to achieve geographic
coordination may also result in streets that do not meet, in police
protection programs that operate in isolated ignorance of each other,
if not in actual conflict, and in transportation regulation programs
that militate against the overall interests of area-wide mass
transportation. For example, at one time the city of Houston
conducted a comprehensive anti-rabies program while the surrounding
Harris County did not. Through no fault of their own, Houston's
program was considerably undermined by the county's availability as
a privileged sanctuary for unvaccinated dogs. l2
12. HARRIS COUNTY HOME RULE COMM'N, METROPOLITAN HARRIS COUNTY 27 (1957).
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B. Functional Coordination
Another coordination problem exists within and among both
rural and urban governments-that of coordination of effort among
different functions or services. This problem, however, is especially
complicated by the multiplicity of special district governments or
"authorities" in metropolitan areas. For example, failure to
coordinate the functions of health and education may result either in a
school program which provides inadequate access to school children
by public health specialists, or in a public health program which gives
inadequate attention to the importance of the educational aspects of
public health for the child. Similarly, the functions of education and
recreation may be operated so in isolation from each other that the
physical location of schools and parks makes cooperation in these
programs exceedingly difficult. What citizen has not commented on
the stupidity of public works "planning" which permits new street
construction to be followed in a few weeks by sewer or water
department crews who tear up the new street for their own project? A
city's human relations commission may work energetically for racially
integrated housing while the independent local housing authority may
move ahead equally energetically with public housing plans which
effectively produce or preserve racial ghettos. Coordination between
different functions is difficult enough when all the functions are part
of a single government, but it is doubly difficult when the functional
bureaucracies are institutionalized into separate governmental
jurisdictions.
C. Financial Coordination
Failure to achieve coordination of the financial resources of a
metropolitan area is clearly more than an academic problem. Such
failure leads to a structure for financing public schools in which those
areas ranking highest in number of school age children, may rank
lowest in, taxable resources. All too often the areas in need of
expensive specialized education for underprivileged children are the
areas least productive of tax revenue for the schools. It is only good
luck when the particular jurisdiction with the greatest need for capital
improvements is also the jurisdiction with the necessary capacity to
issue bonds. Lack of coordination leads to such inequities as double
taxation of citizens by overlapping layers of government and "free
loading" by suburban citizens out of reach of the core city tax
collector. In short, without fiscal coordination in metropolitan areas,
it is impossible to achieve the twin goals of collecting the revenue
[VOL. 22
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wherever the financial resources are located and spending the revenue
wherever the problems and needs are found.
D. Coordination of Human Resources
A final type of coordination, one which seldom receives fanfare
in the discussion of metropolitan problems, is coordination of the
human resources of the metropolis. In examining the fragmented
pattern of local governments in metropolitan areas, one finds several
types of effects in the field of human relations and in the utilization of
human resources. One obvious result is the legal segregation of able
suburban business and civic leaders from involvement in the diagnosis
of, and attack upon, the serious problems of the core city. These
leaders are affected by core city problems and many feel a sense of
moral responsibility for working toward their solution, but, with only
rare exceptions, they are "carpetbaggers" who cannot vote, run for
office, or even serve on boards or commissions in the inner city. A
second result of fragmentation is the inability of smaller fragmented
governments to recruit and retain highly specialized and
professionalized administrative personnel to work at the complicated
task of solving urban problems. The small, amateurish, splinter cities
simply cannot compete with a much larger unit of government for
trained municipal manpower. Additionally, the benefits of computer
technology and automatic data processing can be secured for the
many parts of small and medium-size metropolitan areas only if the
parts agree in some way to coordinate their efforts in meeting human
resource requirements.
Even in the matter of citizen control of his government, there is a
problem of human resource coordination. One of the surest results of
the fragmentation of local government in metropolitan areas is the
confusion, frustration, and even disgust of citizens as they seek to
pinpoint responsibility for urban problems and to find ways of
bringing about change. With all the talk about metropolitan "super-
governments" as a threat to easy political access by the citizen, there
has been far too little talk about the citizens' present inability to
participate effectively in solutions to present critical area-wide prob-
lems that cut across jurisdictional boundary lines. The typically frag-
mented metropolitan area today has few desks adorned with the sign,
"The buck stops here." The metropolitan status quo is hardly grassroots
democracy at its best.
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III. CAN STRUCTURAL CHANGE PRODUCE METROPOLITAN
COORDINATION?
Although it is a common mistake of over-zealous reform groups
to assume that structural reorganization of local government in a
metropolitan area will somehow guarantee these four types of
coordination of effort, it is just as serious a mistake to assume that
Governmental structure, at most, is only one of many important
Truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Governmental structure, at most, is only one of many important
elements determining whether a metropolitan community governs
itself effectively.
It is more accurate, then, to speak of local government structures
which tend to produce coordination, rather than actually producing or
guaranteeing coordination. No doubt certain structural changes tend
to achieve greater coordination than others. It is possible to classify
the dozen or so approaches to metropolitan reorganization in terms of
those which tend to produce greater coordination and those which
tend to produce more limited coordination At the risk of
oversimplification, the commonly proposed "metropolitan solutions"
may be grouped as follows: (A) Approaches tending to produce
greater coordination are: (I) annexation, (2) city-county consolidation,
(3) metropolitan federation, (4) the reorganized urban county, and (5)
unitary area-wide metropolitan government. (B) Approaches tending
to produce limited coordination are: (1) single-purpose special
districts, (2) multi-purpose special districts, (3) intergovernmental
contractual agreements, (4) extra-territorial authority, (5) functional
consolidation, (6) the council of governments, and (7) regional
planning.
A. Approaches Tending to Produce Greater Coordination
I. Annexation.-Annexation, at one time the almost exclusive
method proposed to achieve area-wide coordination, was used by the
nation's great cities to achieve their present size. But annexation has run
into almost insurmountable political and legal obstacles because most of
the older and larger cities in the United States are totally surrounded by
an "iron ring" of separate suburban incorporations. Liberal annexation
procedures in certain states have made it possible for smaller and
medium-sized cities to continue to use the annexation method. 3
13. Texas home rule cities may annex by vote of the city council without a votc of the
residents of either the city or the fringe area. Virginia permits annexation decisions by a special
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Oklahoma City, for example, has made spectacular use of annexation,
taking in more than 550 square miles since 1959. Houston, Phoenix, and
Tulsa have also carried out mammoth annexation programs.
2. City-County Consolidation.-City-county consolidation was
traditionally proposed primarily as a means of eliminating the
duplications and inequities between two layers of government. Until
recently, it was "written off" by most political scientists as a dead issue,
unfeasible because of legal complexities and popular resistance to
changing old landmarks. In 1962, however, city-county consolidation
was used as a means of achieving a unique metropolitan form of
government for the Nashville, Tennessee, area. 4 Nashville used this
approach not only to eliminate city-county duplications and inequities,
but also to provide coordinated area-wide government for an urbanizing
area of 533 square miles and nearly 500,000 people. As if to prove that
the Nashville experience was not merely a rare accident, the citizens of
Jacksonville, Florida, and Duval County voted in 1967 to consolidate
their governments in a plan very similar to the Nashville approach.'5 The
ratio of defeats to adoptions still runs heavily against the reformers, but
the Nashville and Jacksonville examples make it a little premature to
sound the death knell for city-county consolidation.
3. Metropolitan Federation.-A compromise between total
consolidation and no consolidation is the metropolitan federation
approach, as exemplified by Toronto's two-tier government and, to a
certain extent, by that of Dade County and Miami, Florida. 6 A
metropolitan federation for Toronto and its twelve suburban satellite
cities was created by the provincial government in 1953. It divided the
functions of local government, giving certain functions to the area-wide
annexation court which judges the merits of each attempt. Tennessee has a procedure which borrows
from both the Texas and Virginia procedures, permitting annexation by the city council's vote,
subject to possible appeal to court for approval or disapproval based on standards of welfare and
progress for the area as a whole.
14. For additional information on the Nashville consolidation, see D. BOOTH,
METROPOLITICS : THE NASHVILLE CONSOLIDATION (1963); H. DUNCOMBE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 155-230 (1966); B. HAWKINS, NASHVILLE METRO: THE POLITICS OF CITY-COUNTY
CONSOLIDATION (1966); R. MARTIN, METROPOLIS IN TRANSITION (1963); Grant, A Comparison of
Predictions and Experience with Nashville **Metro ", I URBAN AFFAIRS Q. 34-54 (1965).
15. For a journalist's account of the adoption of the Jacksonville plan, see R. MARTIN,
CONSOLIDATION: JACKSONVILLE AND DUVAL COUNTY (1968).
16. For details of the Toronto approach, see J. GRUMM, METROPOLITAN AREA GOVERNMENT:
THE TORONTO EXPERIENCE (1959); H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A FUNCTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF METRO TORONTO (1967); F. SMALLWOOD, METRO TORONTO: A DECADE LATER
(1963). For studies of the Miami experience, see G. SERINO, MIAMI'S METROPOLITAN EXPERIMENT
(1958); E. SOFEN, THE MIAMI METROPOLITAN EXPERIMENT (1963); R. WOLF, MIAMI METRO: THE
ROAD TO URBAN UNITY (1960).
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government and reserving others to the thirteen cities. In 1966, following
a comprehensive study by a Royal Commission, the provincial
government consolidated the thirteen cities into six (the core city plus
five boroughs), and transferred some additional functions to the metro
government. The Dade County metro government, adopted in 1957,
incorporates, to a limited degree, the principle of federation. The city of
Miami and 27 suburban cities were retained for the performance of
"purely local" functions and Dade County was expected to provide
functions which are "essentially metropolitan" in character. Because of
strong opposition from the cities, a succession of life and death charter
amendment referendums, a multitude of lawsuits, and court restrictions
on the county's fiscal powers, Dade County's functions have been much
less centralized than those of Toronto's metro. But the Miami plan,
though only partially executed, has offered a strong ray of hope to other
metropolitan areas.
4. The Reorganized Urban County.-A close proximation of the
Miami approach to achieving metropolitan coordination is that of the
reorganized urban county, which focuses primarily on achieving the
benefits of area-wide government for either a doughnut-shaped portion
of the county outside the core city, as in the case of Los Angeles County,
or for a totally suburban county such as Montgomery County,
Maryland. In these and many other cases the county government has
become, in effect, the municipal government for large portions of the
metropolitan population, while continuing to perform more limited and
more traditional "county functions" for the core cities and some of the
larger suburban cities. County performance of these urban-type services
varies considerably from fairly mandatory and direct arrangements to
such voluntary systems as Los Angeles County's "Lakewood Plan,"
which -seeks to secure the benefits of large scale economies through
"package contracts" with the county, while retaining the benefits of
small city autonomy in the midst of a metropolis. 7 The implicit
assumption of this approach to metropolitan coordination is that the
more the large urbanized county proves its capabilities in the suburban
areas, the more the core city will gradually turn "area-wide" functions
over to the county, thus achieving over-all coordination by means of
evolution.
5. Unitary Area-Wide Metropolitan Government.-The utopian
model for achieving governmental coordination of the entire
metropolitan area is so simple that one not accustomed to the
17. For a description and appraisal of the Lakewood Plan. see J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT,
THE METROPOLIS: ITS PEOPLE, POLITICS AND ECONO.MIC LiFL 388-92 (1965).
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"American way" of structuring local government might fail to see why
it has not been universally adopted. The structure would be a single,
expandable, area-wide unit of metropolitan government created by the
state to govern each metropolitan community. All other units of local
government within a metropolitan area would be abolished except for
those judged absolutely necessary to protect important values of local
diversity and to provide a sense of sub-community representation in the
overall government. The political feasibility of this and other
approaches is considered subsequently in this article, but it is obvious
that this approach must be rated low on the American political totem
pole.
B. Approaches Tending to Produce Limited Coordination
1. Special Districts.-Turning to approaches which tend to
produce more limited coordination in the metropolis, many more
options are available from which to choose. The most popular from
many standpoints is the special district, a separate unit of government
whose boundary lines may be drawn to coincide with the boundaries of
the problem, irrespective of other political boundary lines. The fact that
it is usually a single-purpose unit of government adds to its political
feasibility by minimizing the amount of disturbance to other aspects of
local government. In recent years, however, there has been a growing
willingness on the part of state legislatures to permit special districts to
exercise more than one function, and some metropolitan specialists have
begun to see in the multi-purpose district an evolutionary approach to
general metropolitan government. Among the older and better known
special metropolitan authorities are the Chicago Sanitary District,
organized in 1889, and the Port of New York Authority, established by
interstate compact between New York and New Jersey in 1921.
Although special districts score well on the limited objective of
executing a specific project, they are presently the major contributor to
the multiplication of the independent "thousand islands" of local
government which divide the metropolis. Roscoe C. Martin is sharply
critical of the widespread tendency to resort to special districts, and cites
several ill effects: it separates the program from the mainstream of city
affairs; it purports to "remove the program from politics" but in
actuality tends to replace the general politics of the city with a more
narrow, less visible, less public, politics of a special clientele; and finally,
it "tends to atomize local government," making comprehensive
1969]
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planning of local programs a virtual impossiblity.'8 In summary, it may
be said that area-wide special districts tend to produce intra-functional
coordination but tend to frustrate inter-functional coordination.
2. Intergovernmental Contractual Agreements.- Contractual
agreements between different units of government have long been a
voluntary approach to metropolitan coordination, and their over-all
achievements range from outstanding success to dismal failure. The
successes most frequently occur where service is the major element of
governmental activity, and the failures most frequently occur where
regulation and control are involved. One city seldom volunteers to be
regulated by another; so the element of voluntarism is both the strength
and weakness of the intergovernmental cooperation approach to
metropolitan coordination.
3. Extra- Territorial Authority.- Extra-territorial authority-the
power of a city to perform certain functions outside its city limits-is
granted by the state and does not depend upon voluntary consent for its
validity. This makes it more effective than voluntary cooperation,
particularly in regulatory matters of great concern to a large city in the
immediate fringe area outside its boundaries. However, this device runs
into several difficulties when considered as a permanent approach to
metropolitan coordination. The problem of financing extra-territorial
functions in an equitable way is troublesome, and the problem of
exercising governmental power over persons who cannot participate in
the democratic control of that government is even more troublesome.
4. Functional Consolidation.- Functional consolidation is
similiar in many respects to the area-wide special district as an approach
to metropolitan coordination. It involves the performance by one unit of
government, frequently the county, of a function previously performed
by two or more units, without a complete territorial or political merger
of those units. It differs from the typical special district in that it utilizes
an existing unit of government rather than creating a new one. Thus, to a
certain extent, it is less vulnerable to the charge that it achieves intra-
functional coordination at the expense of inter-functional coordination.
Functional consolidation becomes a kind of half-a-loaf strategy for
governing the metropolis.
5. The Council of Governments.-The newest device for achieving
greater harmony of effort in the metropolitan area-the council of
governments (COG)-is praised by its advocates as the wave of the
future and criticized by its opponents as a toothless tiger and a protector
18. R. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 178-79 (1965).
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of the inadequate status quo. The COG is a voluntary association of
local governments in a metropolitan area, usually a council of elected
officials, designed to facilitate discussion and study of common
problems. A real shot in the arm was given to the COG's by a 1965
congressional authorization of financial assistance for planning.
Although it tends to over-represent the small suburban governments in
is decision-making structure and is plagued by the usual weaknesses of
voluntarism, the COG seems destined to become a common institutional
addition to the metropolitan scene.
6. Regional Planning.-A related proposal to the COG approach
to metropolitan coordination is that of regional planning. As with
motherhood and the home, regional planning has few opponents. The
only debate is whether regional planning will accomplish the major
purposes of metropolitan area coordination without significantly
restructuring the local governments. Regional planning is based upon the
premises that effective planning always depends upon the "authority of
ideas" and that any planning worth its salt can be sold to the elected
officials of the fragmented governments in the metropolis. Regional
planning was given a strong boost in 1966 when Congress provided that
certain applications for federal assistance within metropolitan areas
must be submitted for review and comment by an approved regional
planning agency for that area. Known as the '.'204 review process," the
requrement provides that:
All applications made after June 30, 1967, for Federal loans or grants to assist in
carrying open space land projects or for the planning or construction of hospitals,
airports, libraries, water supply and distribution facilities, sewerage facilities and
waste treatment works, highways, transportation facilities, and water development
and land conservation projects within any metropolitan area shall be submitted for
review to any area-wide agency which is designated to perform metropolitan or
regional planning for the area. 9
The U.S. Bureau of the Budget designates the appropriate regional
planning agency in each area to perform this function. Where regional
planning agencies did not already exist, a COG was frequently
established for this purpose, and subsequently designated by the Bureau
of the Budget. Some federal aid programs provide a financial bonus to
those applications which are certified as consistent with the existing
official plans for the region. It remains to be seen whether regional
planning, in concert with the COG, can achieve the purposes of
metropolitan coordination without structural change of local
19. The Demonstrations Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 § 204,42 U.S.C.
§ 3334(a) (Supp. il, 1965-66).
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government. However, without a significantly stronger policy of state
and federal carrots and sticks, this approach seems to fall far short of
achieving over-all metropolitan coordination, particularly with respect
to the coordination of both financial and human resources as discussed
earlier.
IV. Is AREA-WIDE METRO GOVERNMENT A LIVE OPTION FOR THE
1970's?
Although the rational case for some kind of unified government for
the metropolitan area would seem to be overwhelmingly strong, the
prospects that our 233 areas will have such governments in the 1970's are
poor indeed. The record of previous rejections of elaborate schemes for
metro-type governments, if projected to the future, would suggest that no
more than a baker's dozen of the 233 can be expected to adopt metro
within the next two decades. The "American way" of permitting the
small parts of the metropolis to determine at the polls the over-all
governmental structure for the area serves as a strong guardian of the
status quo. Furthermore, the likelihood that many presently separate
metropolitan areas will become merged with other areas into a giant
"megalopolis," such as that between Boston and Washington, puts an
additional damper on proposals for unified metropolitan government.
The prevailing position of many urban officials seems to be that of a
prominent mayor who once told this writer, "I am not an advocate of
metropolitan government but I am an advocate of metropolitan
cooperation." It would be necessary to change this kind of thinking
before one could speak of metropolitan government as a "live option."
The evidence that area-wide government for the metropolis is a live
option rests primarily on the rather surprising recent successes in
Nashville and Jacksonville and the rash of new interest which has been
generated in many of the smaller and medium-sized metropolitan areas.
City officials and civic leaders in Nashville and Jacksonville have
entertained a steady stream of visitors from other areas who wish to
know how area-wide government operates, and whether the plan is
exportable. Miami's two-tier scheme and Baton Rouge's partial
consolidation have also been in the spotlight. In addition, such foreign
cities as Toronto, Winnipeg, and London provide the nagging reminder
that area-wide metro government is not a total impossibility for those
who think it worth the effort.
The United States Supreme Court reapportionment decisions have
set in motion political changes bordering on revolutions, and some have
suggested that they have contributed to making metro government a live
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option. Baker v. CarP° and Reynolds v. Sims21 signal the demise of rural
domination of state legislatures. It remains to be seen, however, whether
the new suburban strength will be any more sympathetic to metro. A very
v. Midland County,22 which extended the one-man-one-vote
reapportionment decision to county governing bodies, may prove to be
instrumental in increased use of the county as a unit of area-wide
metropolitan government. Certainly the old rural stance of county
government was one of the most serious barriers to city-county
consolidation.
In balance, the most optimistic answer possible to the question of
whether metro government is a live option for the 1970's is simply that
"it all depends." While much of the evidence is discouraging to
advocates of major structural reform, the ultimate answer does depend
upon what happens in four critical issue-areas: (1) state urban policy
outcomes-the direction and extent of state involvement in urban
affairs; (2) black power and white power issues-the extent to which
white and/or black backlash may lose votes or gain votes for metro; (3)
the possible use of federal carrots and sticks to bring about significant
structural change in local government; and (4) the degree of success by
reform advocates in exploiting crisis situations.
It is theoretically possible for all four of the above factors to turn
solidly in the direction of support for metropolitan government, and if
so, government for the metropolis might undergo radical surgery in the
next decade or two. The possibility, however, is considerably greater that
all four factors might turn against the establishment of area-wide metro
governments. Although states seem to be shaking off their rural dust and
moving toward urban involvement, there has been almost no indication
thus far that states will assume the same strong hand in restructuring the
metropolis that led the Canadian province of Ontario to reorganize
Toronto. The states' strong hand in achieving massive consolidation of
school districts shows that it can be done, but no state has really moved
on the metropolis yet. The race issue is a two-edged sword that seems
destined to cause black-power leaders to resist the expansion of core city
boundaries and white-power leaders to favor such expansion, each for
the same reason-the belief that to do so would dilute Negro political
power. Sincere reform advocates, whether black or white, will be caught
in strange alliances with persons they think want to do the "right thing
for the wrong reason."
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
22. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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It seems clear that federal carrots and sticks will be used
increasingly to accomplish national objectives in metropolitan areas,
and that "coordination" is definitely one of these objectives. While it is
theoretically possible that these federal incentives and sanctions might be
used to promote metropolitan consolidations of general-purpose
governments, past history indicates that federal pressure usually
promotes only "cooperation" among separate units or, at most, special-
purpose consolidations on a function-by-function basis, such as for
health, airports, or sewers. Only a sharp change in federal direction
could make federal programs a significant force in the creation of area-
wide metropolitan governments. The fourth factor mentioned as holding
the key to the establishment of metropolitan government, the possible
exploitation of crisis situations, is closely related to future federal policy
on the structure of government in metropolitan areas. "Muddle
through" is the theme song except in cases of extreme crisis, and a
tendency to muddle through almost never produces radical new
structures for governing the metropolis.
V. WHAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY ALTERN4ATIVES TO METRO?
If area-wide metropolitan government of some kind is not achieved
for the bulk of the metropolitan areas in the United States, what are the
most likely alternatives? The goal of metropolitan coordination will
probably be pursued through an increasingly confusing maze of
intergovernmental techniques which have come to be known as
cooperative federalism or "creative federalism." Coordination of
financial resources between core cities and suburbs of various degrees of
poverty and wealth can only come from state or federal taxation and
grant-in-aid programs. Intra-functional coordination will continue to be
attempted through the creation of special district governments,
metropolitan authorities, and some functional consolidations. Inter-
functional and geographic coordination will be attempted in part
through increased support for comprehensive planning agencies and the
voluntary COG's, and in part through coordination battles fought out
between the involved agencies in Washington. It is possible, though less
likely, that inter-functional coordination may be achieved by inter-
agency arrangements at the state level. Human resource coordination
within metropolitan areas will be the most difficult of all to achieve, but
the most likely alternative to area-wide metropolitan government is the
reliance on essentially non-governmental structures for the metropolis
and on the governing bodies of single-purpose area-wide authorities.
If the picture just described seems to resemble a kind of
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intergovernmental jungle in metropolitan areas, it is no accident.
Basically, this is the direction in which we are headed if no way is found
to develop a drastically simplified structure of local government for the
American metropolis. The picture is one of constricted core city
governments predominantly black in ethnic make-up, surrounded by
scores to hundreds of separate islands of suburban government, and
overlaid with several county governments, a multitude of ad hoc special
districts and occasional multi-purpose districts, with strong vertical lines
of financial assistance, controls, and guidelines leading through and
around the state government to a variety of parent federal agencies. The
picture is not one of metropolitan catastrophe, for the American people
have a way of acting just short of governmental catastrophe. But it is
hardly a picture of a governmental system designed to respond with
reasonable effectiveness to the felt and expressed needs of urban people.

